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THE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR, 1950-1953*

Russell A. Smithf

D URING its last three terms the United States Supreme Court
handed down some 30 decisions in the field of labor law (exclusive of workmen's compensation and cases of little individual
importance). The period had its share of important, if not "great,"
cases. Probably the steel seizure decision of 1952 was the most
significant in its general implications, but a number of other decisions were of major consequence in the administration of the
federal labor relations and wage-hour legislation.
Certain statistics relating to these cases may be of interest. The
distribution, by subdivisions of the field, was as follows:
Federal labor relations laws
Tart-Hartley Act ...........................
Railway Labor Act ........................
W age-hour legislation ..........................
Emergency strikes (seizure) ................
Picketing (constitutional issue) ............

20
2
22
4
2
2

Of the 30 decisions, eight were unanimous (on the part of the
justices participating), three were 7-1 or 8-1, six were 7-2, twelve
were 6-3, and only one was 5-4, which perhaps marks this period
* This article was read before the Section of Labor Relations Law of the American
Bar Association at Boston, Massachusetts, on August 24, 1953.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan; member of the Michigan and New York
State Bars.
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as one of the more harmonious among the members of the high
tribunal as respects labor law issues. The leading dissenter, by
far, was Mr. Justice Douglas, who disagreed 14 times. Justices
Burton, Clark and Frankfurter, with two, three and four dissents,
respectively, were most often in agreement with the decisions,
with Justices Reed, Jackson, Black and the Chief Justice following
closely. The most prolix and "opinionated" decision of all was in
the steel seizure case, where six separate opinions in support of
the result, and one dissenting opinion, were filed.
This paper will attempt a review of these decisions. Since the
cases involved, for the most part, highly diverse problems, a
review of them must necessarily lack a central theme unless the
reviewer has been able to detect some evidence of a general
tendency' or attitude which he considers noteworthy (such, for
example, as an evident disposition to enlarge or curtail labor's
rights or privileges). Unfortunately, perhaps because I am lacking
in the necessary sensitivity, I have nothing to report along this
line. On the whole, while critical of some of the decisions, my
reaction is that the Court has done an altogether unsensational,
but quite judicial, job, meeting each issue as it arose with becoming objectivity, and, granting the validity of recent precedents,
forging, on the whole, no new works of judicial lawmaking.
EMERGENCY

DISPUTES:

GOVERNMENTAL

SEIZURE

Federal seizure of industrial property as a means of averting
or stopping a critical strike was brought to the attention of the
Court in the Peewee Coal Co. case in 1951 as well as in the later
steel seizure case. The former presented the question of the legal
consequences of seizure, as between owner and the Government;
the latter raised the question of the authority to seize. In each
instance, the Court's decision has vitally affected thinking with
respect to the problem of so-called "emergency disputes."
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United States v. Peewee Coal Co., Inc.,' held that a wartime
executive seizure of a mining property was a "taking" of such
property by the United States, for which the Government became
liable under the Fifth Amendment to pay that part of the actual
operating loss, incurred during the period of Government possession, attributable to increased payments to labor made to comply
with a National War Labor Board directive. All the members of
the Court agreed that there was a "taking," and four of the
justices, in the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Black, broadly
asserted that, by virtue of the seizure, the Government "became
the proprietor," thus becoming entitled to any profits and liable
for any operating losses. This consequence of proprietorship was
regarded as "conceptually distinct from the Government's obligation to pay fair compensation for property taken," and on a
proper record the majority would evidently hold that the entire
operating loss, if any, sustained by the business during Government possession could be recovered. The approach of the majority
was not in terms of "damages" suffered by the owners due to
seizure; so the profit or loss position of the business apart from
seizure would be regarded as immaterial. The opinion recognized,
but found it unnecessary to solve, the "difficult problems inherent
in fixing the value of the use of a going concern" in connection
with a temporary taking.
The implications of the majority opinion are very interesting.
Apparently the cost to the taxpayers of seizing a losing business
or industry would be the operating losses, but in this situation
it is hardly likely (though perhaps conceivable) that the Government could be liable for a distinct element of compensation for
the "value" of the use. The cost of seizing a profitable business
would be the fair value of the use, arrived at on some basis yet
to be determined, but this would be offset (from the standpoint
of the public treasury) by the profits earned during the period
of possession. Thus it would seem possible if not likely that it
1341 U.S. 114 (1951).
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would cost the taxpayers more to seize a losing business than a
profitable business, which seems anomalous, to say the least,
except on the assumption that the seizure had in effect forced the
losing enterpriser to stay in business when he would have elected
to close down and avoid continuing losses. The view of Mr. Justice Reed, concurring in the result, or of dissenting Justices
Burton, Vinson, Clark and Minton, would seem to be much more
reasonable, at least for the situation of the losing enterpriser.
Mr. Justice Reed would force the government to bear only
special increments of loss (of which the increase in labor costs
in question was regarded as an instance) incurred "without legal
or business necessity so to do." The dissenters would place the
burden on the owners to prove that the seizure had actually harmed
them financially, and, if so, by what amount. As Mr. Justice Reed
points out, there are various kinds and purposes of "temporary
takings," and seizures in labor dispute situations have not, as a
rule, displaced the actual authority of management except to deal
with the particular labor relations issues in dispute. As he suggests, it ought to be possible to apply the constitutional requirement of "just compensation" more flexibly than the majority
opinion would seem to permit.
The question of Presidential authority to seize, under the powers
inherent in his office, was the issue in the Youngstown case.2
The situation out of which the case arose is familiar and need
not be restated here. The decision against the existence of executive power, under the circumstances, was perhaps more important in its delineation and application of constitutional doctrine
concerning the division of powers between Congress and the President than for its contribution to labor law, or even to the Settlement
of the steel dispute. The basic power of the National Government
to fashion special procedures, including even seizure, for meeting
the problem of critical disputes was not at issue, and was declared
to exist.
2

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Nor can the case be considered to have settled all aspects of
the problem of executive authority, for the clear-cut if oversimple exposition of the principles of separation of powers contained in Mr. Justice Black's opinion actually represented only
the view of himself and Mr. Justice Douglas. To some extent and
in varying degree the other members of the Court appear to hold
the view that the President possesses inherent power to deal with
critical labor disputes, even in peacetime, exercisable to the extent
not inconsistent with discernible Congressional will.' The key factor motivating the decision was apparently the fact that Congress,
in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, settled upon certain emergency
dispute procedures after considering and rejecting others, including seizure and compulsory arbitration. This expression of legislative determination was not to be overridden by executive action.
The two cases, Peewee Coal and Youngstown, must necessarily
be influential in the almost continuous struggle to evolve a suitable
statutory policy for the handling of emergency disputes. Peewee
Coal emphasizes the serious financial repercussions entailed by
seizure, both for the Government and for the owners of the property, absent an advance agreement on their solution, and will
likely operate as a deterrent to its use. The steel case will prevent
the use of seizure at the national level under present conditions,
and should likewise serve to deter resort to other strategems (such
as, for example, the creation of non-statutory emergency boards
to investigate and recommend, as in the steel dispute, itself). At
the same time the decision should heighten interest in the subject
of statutory treatment of the problem. If, for industries subject
to Taft-Hartley, the sole recourse of the executive in critical
cases must be to the Title II procedures, we had better be satisfied
that these procedures are the best answer we can currently provide.
3 See the analysis of the opinions in Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the
President and the Supreme Court, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 141 (1952). For other interesting
discussions of the case see Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 89
(1952) ; and Petro, The Supreme Court and the Steel Seizure, 3 Labor L.J. 451 (1952).
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PICKETING AND THE CONSTITUTION

During the period under review the Court spoke twice on the
legislative power to regulate peaceful picketing, and, in so doing,
continued the process of dilution of Thornhill v. Alabama.' It
will be recalled that in the Thornhill case, with only Mr. Justice
McReynolds dissenting, the Court in 1940 struck down an Alabama statute, dealing with loitering or picketing, because it
encompassed "nearly every practicable, effective means whereby
those interested-including the employees directly affected-may
enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute."
The basic premise was that "in the circumstances of our time
the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor
dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion
that is guaranteed by the Constitution." What happened during the

ensuing ten years, in Swing,5 Meadowmoor, Wohl,' Ritter's Cale,'
Angelos,9 Giboney,' Gazzam," Hanket2 and Hughes,1" is familiar
to every labor lawyer.
First to be mentioned, in our present review, is IBEW v.
NLRB, 1 decided in 1951, which must be discussed later in another context. Here, in determining whether peaceful construction
job-site picketing could be brought under Section 8(b) (4) (A) of
the amended NLRA, the Court had to meet the "free speech"
question. One short paragraph in the opinion sufficed to dispose
4 310 U.S. 88 (1940).

5 AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
6 Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287 (1941).
7 Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802, Teamsters Union v. Wohl, 315
U.S. 769 (1942).
$ Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
9 Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
10 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
11 Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
12 Teamsters Union, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).

Is Hughes v. Superior Court of California etc., 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
14 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
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of the matter. The Court, said Mr. Justice Burton, had only recently
recognized the constitutional right of the states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of unlawful objectives comparable to the
secondary boycott. "There is no reason why Congress may not do
likewise." The Justice had in mind, of course, the 1950 decisions
in Gazzam, Hanke and Hughes, where the Court permitted state
regulation of picketing based upon the "objectives" test. Secondary picketing, despite the peculiar nomenclature employed in
the Taft-Hartley Act, is scarcely a union "objective." It is a
means to the objective. However, one can quite readily agree that
if the states may constitutionally prohibit picketing because the
union seeks thereby to force the employer to impose unionism on
his employees, or to conform to union standards with respect to
closing hours or to hire a quota of negro employees, it ought to
be open to them, or to Congress, to pass judgment upon the use
of picketing when there is an involvement of third persons.
The second case is Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, etc., AFL v. Graham,1 5 decided in 1953. Here,
with Justices Black and Douglas in dissent, a broad injunction
against peaceful construction job-site picketing, carried on by
building trades unions in protest against the use of non-union
labor, was upheld. The injunction had been granted by the
Virginia courts on the basis that the picketing sought to accomplish
aims and purposes in conflict with the open shop policy contained
in Virginia's "Right to Work" statute. This law outlawed (although
not retroactively) all forms of agreement between employers and
unions conditioning employment on union membership, and forbade employers to require of their employees union membership
or the check-off. The Court's decision was simply an application
of the principle announced in 1950 in the Gazzam-Hanke-Hughes
trilogy, and foreshadowed by Giboney in 1949, that picketing is
not such a constitutional right that it may be carried on for purposes deemed, not unreasonably, to be improper. The question
15 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
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whether the union actually demanded the dismissal of non-union
labor, or, on the other hand, merely sought to publicize the job as
"non-union," was present, but was properly resolved, on the
record, against the union.16 The question whether such a question
is material remains open by virtue of the remark in the Graham
opinion that "petitioners here engaged in more than the mere publication of the fact that the job was not 100% union" and by the
Court's allusion to the fact that the picketing was calculated to,
and did, induce union workers to leave the premises, thus adding
direct and important economic pressure on the "employer." On
the basis of this remark, and the similar suggestion in the Gazzam
opinion, union counsel will doubtless continue to be hopeful that
peaceful organizational picketing as such, unaccompanied by any
immediate demand for recognition or for the execution by the
employer of union shop policies, may yet be salvaged as a civil
right of union members. I submit, however, that the logic of the
recent cases is against this view, and I find some indication that
the Court intends to be logical in the recent denial of certiorari
in certain Michigan cases presenting the issue.'7
16 As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the Union official
denied that he made any demand for the discharge of any non-union labor or for the
cancellation of any existing sub-contract with non-union subcontractors, and testified
that the Union's purpose was to inform union men that non-union employees were being
used on the job. However, the quoted testimony of the business agent shows that he was
se, king the general observance of the policy of using subcontractors who employed
union labor, and the finding of the existence of an illegal purpose is easily seen to be
justified if it can be assumed that the "union" subcontractors who were available for the
work employed union labor as a matter of deliberate policy, and not fortuitously.
17 The two cases were Postma v. Teamsters Union, Local Union No. 406, 334 Mich.
347, 54 N.W. 2d 681 (1952), cert. denied, April 6, 1953, and Way Baking Company v.
Teamsters Union, Local No. 164, 56 N.W. 2d 357 (Mich. 1953), cert. denied, May 18,
1953. In each the record would scarcely support a finding that the union had made a
specific request that the non-union plaintiff force its employees to join the union. In
each an injunction against organizational picketing was affirmed. In Postma the Michigan Supreme Court found that the union's objective was "to force Postma's employees
to become members of the union." In Way Baking Company the Court found that "the
defendants were undertaking by their picketing activities [part of which consisted of
secondary picketing of customers] to so injure the business of plaintiff, and to bring
about such a loss of commissions on the part of plaintiff's driver salesmen, as to compel
plaintiff to insist that said employees join the union, and likewise to force said employees
to do so for their own protection." If the latter constituted a finding that the union was
attempting to coerce the employer into pressuring its employees into the union, it was
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It is now, of course, obvious that the Supreme Court has found
room, despite Thornhill, for the application to picketing of the
venerable, if sometimes maligned, common law and legislative
ends-means test. One may wonder, in retrospect, why the Court in
1940 elected to use the "free speech" analysis as a means of circumscribing regulatory action. That which, in the Thornhill
opinion of Justice Murphy was regarded as the most practicable
and effective means of publicizing a labor dispute" now is said
to contain but an "element" or "ingredient" of "communication,"
and to embody "inherent" "compulsive features" which make it
subject to regulation. 9 The communication aspect of picketing
appears to have been so subordinated that the civil rights and
"substantive due process" constitutional tests have become fairly
indistinguishable, and thus negligible, in their impact. As in the
case of the problem of emergency disputes, the influence of this
current attitude of the Court is to force attention upon the totality
of policy considerations which should, in balance, determine the
extent and nature of the legal privilege to picket.
a finding which was based on the existence of the primary and secondary picketing,
nothing more. Thus, the Michigan court's position apparently is that any organizational
picketing is offensive to Michigan policy, except, possibly, where it can be found that
the principal purpose of the picketing is to protest work standards of the picketed
employer to the extent that they are lower than the union scale.
The possible legal distinction between pure organizational picketing, and picketing
to compel the employer to force unionization upon his employees, presents nice questions
of fact. For some of the more interesting recent cases on the problem see Blue Boar
Cafeteria Company, Incorporated v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l
Union, Local No. 181, 254 S.W. 2d 335 (Ky. App. 1952) ; Pappas v. Local Joint Executive Board of Philadelphia, 374 Pa. 34, 96 A. 2d 915 (1953) ; and Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Retail Clerks Int'l Union, Local No. 526, 264 Wis. 189, 58 N.W.
2d 655 (1953).
18 It could be contended, despite the obvious general slant of Mr. Justice Murphy's
opinion, that the Thornhill case did not actually decide that picketing is a constitutionally
protected form of publication. The case came up on a record showing the application of
the statute to picketing; however, the Court purported to hold that the statute was
invalid on its face, without regard, therefore, to the specific application, and in doing so
pointed out that "in sum, whatever the means used to publicize the facts of a labor dispute, whether by printed sign, by pamphlet, by word of mouth or otherwise, all such activity without exception is within the inclusive prohibition of the statute so long as it
occurs in the vicinity of the scene of the dispute." Without regard to the specific problem
of picketing, the particular decision was justified on the basis that the statute prohibited
even the traditional forms of publication at or near the scene of a labor relations dispute.
19 See, for example, the opinion in the Hughes case.
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Like many if not most other observers, I have tended to regard
as sound the Court's more recent emphasis, for constitutional purposes, upon the coercive aspects of picketing. Yet I have the uncomfortable feeling that we have not fully thought through or
seen the implications of this approach. That which makes peaceful picketing possibly objectionable, hence actionable, is not the!
picketing, itself, provided it is peaceful, but the responses of
others (employees of the picketed employer or of other employers,
or, for example, customers) to the picket line. The Court seems
even today to assume that the unions have a constitutional right
to use the ordinary media of communication (radio, press, pamphlets, etc.) to advertise the existence of a dispute; yet it is obvious,
that, depending upon the sympathies and mores of the community, such publicity may result in responses of the kind elicited
by picketing. Will the Court ultimately, then, be driven to conclude that these non-picketing means of publicizing a union aim
or complaint may be enjoined if the objective is reasonably
deemed to be improper? But would this not, indeed, be going too,
far, for are we not constrained to say, with Justice Murphy, that
"free discussion concerning the conditions in industry, and the
causes of labor disputes," is "indispensable to the effective and
intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shapethe destiny of modern industrial society?" Subject to limitations
deriving, perhaps, from the law of slander and libel, may unions
any more than, for example, business firms, properly be denied
the opportunity of stating their case, and, by way of illustration,
asserting that a given establishment is non-union or has nonunion work standards? Or is this begging the very question? But
if so, what is the question? If the unions have a constitutional
right to the use of the ordinary media of publicity, regardless,
of the extent of the community reaction against the publicized
employer, how can picketing be condemned? Does the answer lie
in conspiracy and combination theory, perhaps by analogy to
trade restraint law?

1954]

1 SUPREME COURT AND LABOR

Suppose we were to make the instigating union, and all persons
in combination with it (other trade unionists, consumers, suppliers, etc.) subject to restraint when the existence of the combination is proved (and perhaps ease the burden of proof by the
use of trade restraint doctrines of parallelism of action, etc.),
but hold publicizing by a union constitutionally privileged if the
combination is not proved. This would require a return to thinking
more like that expressed in the Giboney case, which was originally interpreted by the Section's Committee on State Legislation
as justifying a differentiation between "signal" and "publicity"
picketing.2" The problem, and it is serious, perhaps even insoluble,
lies in the practical difficulty of drawing the suggested line. But
the implications of a refusal to draw such a line are also serious.
We seem to be faced with the alternatives either of minimizing
the publication aspect and emphasizing the economic effects of
picketing and using a combination-conspiracy legal analysis, or,
on the other hand, revitalizing the publication-communication "free
speech" analysis and with it accepting the consequence that some
forms of economic pressure are constitutionally privileged.

TAFT-HARTLEY DECISIONS

The bulk of the Court's labor law decisions during the period
under review have been concerned with problems arising in the
administration of the Taft-Hartley Act. This was to be anticipated
in view of the broad regulatory scope of the statute and the numerous, inevitable questions of interpretation which would arise.
No doubt the process of judicial clarification and implementation
has only nicely started. On the whole the decisions to date reveal
that the Court is disposed to give fair and full effect to the amendments of 1947. There is no evidence of any tendency to emasculate.
20 See the October, 1949, report of the Committee. In the Committee's 1949-1950
report it was conceded that the earlier differentiation was no longer tenable; the Committee saw in the 1950 decisions a clear indication that the Court's attitude toward
picketing had shifted. ("Picketing can no longer be equated to free speech.")
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Judicial Review. With implications which extend far beyond
the confines of labor legislation, the Court in the Universal
Camera21 and Pittsburgh Steamship2 2 cases equated the standard
of proof required of the NLRB by the Act of 1947 with that
exacted generally by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,28
and held that "courts must now assume more responsibility for
the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions than
some courts have shown in the past." The Court was concerned
with the effect of the new statutory language indicating that tile
Board's findings of fact are to be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence "on the record considered as a whole," and, specifically, with the question of the weight to be given a trial
examiner's findings which have not been accepted by the Board.
The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, speaking through Judge
Learned Hand, had held that the court's review function had not
been broadened, but only more definitely expressed and that a
court may not, as a practical matter, "consider the Board's reversal [of an examiner] as a factor in the court's own decision."
In disagreeing, the Supreme Court said that an examiner's conclusions should be accorded "the relevance that they reasonably
command." On the remand the court of appeals, although it had
professed its inability to deal with the subtleties involved, reexamined the record as a whole, and this time held the Board's
findings not adequately supported.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Universal Camera, which
'in its interpretative and expositive parts represented the views of
the entire bench, expressed some warranted skepticism of attempts,
by means of nuances of statutory language, to control judicial
reaction to agency findings. More important than the language
added to the Act in 1947, as the Court evidently believed, was its
history, especially the general background of criticism of the
21 Universal Camera Corp v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951).
22 NLRB v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U. S. 498 (1951).
28 60 STAT. 237; 5 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 1001 et seq.
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fact-finding processes of the Wagner Act Board and, most important of all, the work of the dissenters on the famed Attorney General's committee on administrative procedure in urging upon
Congress the adoption of a broader rule than the "substantial
evidence" rule as recommended by the majority. To use a term
borrowed from Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Court thus proliferated a Congressional purpose to require greater judicial responsibility than theretofore with respect to NLRB fact-finding
processes.
The impact of the statutory change and of the decisions are
likely to be evanescent. For a time, while the legislative history
and the decisions are near at hand, one may expect to find the
courts of appeal more receptive than before 1947 to attacks on
the Board's conclusions of fact, and the Board, itself, particularly
astute to handle fact questions carefully. In the long run it will
doubtless be found, to use the language of the Justice, that "the
ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a
judiciary of high competence and character and the constant play
of an informed professional critique upon its work."
The tangible, immediate effect of these decisions has doubtless
been to strengthen the position of the trial examiners in our ad.
ministrative hierarchy, and this is good. Hearing officers clearly
are in the best position to appraise the evidence, and, provided
they are competent, their findings on purely fact questions should
generally command respect. They are still, however, stepchildren
of the law, for they are neither judges nor are they even the
equivalent of masters in chancery.
Collective Bargaining: The Right to Bargain for the Right of
Unilateral Action. In NLRB v. American National Insurance
Co.24 the Court approved a decision of the Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit,2" setting aside that portion of a Board order requiring
24343 U. S. 395 (1952).

25 187 F. 2d 307 (1951).
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the Company to cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively "by insisting as a condition of agreement, that the said
Union agree to a provision whereby the Respondent reserves to
itself the right to take unilateral action with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions
of employment." Throughout the bargaining, the Company had
urged upon the Union that it agree to the inclusion in the contract
of a "prerogative clause" which would have reserved to the Company the right to finality of decision, free from arbitration but
subject to the grievance machinery, of selection of employees,
promotions, discipline and discharge, and the determination of
work schedules. This proposal countered a Union demand for
arbitration as the terminal point of the contract grievance procedure, and the employer stuck by its guns, as did the Union, over
a bargaining period of about eight months, prior to the Board
hearing.
What the decision means, then, is that an employer may in collective bargaining do what the employer here did, although what
the Court says is that an employer may in good faith bargain for
a contract provision of the kind here proposed.26 Thus, the case
was decided as though the Board had ordered the employer not
to bargain for such a contract provision, although this was not
the language of the order, and it could have been contended, on
the basis of the findings of the examiner, that the order was predicated either on the adamant attitude of the Company with respect
26 The court of appeals took the view that, on the record, the Company, in insisting
upon the prerogative clause, was not any less in good faith than the union was in
resisting its inclusion. The Supreme Court interpreted this as in effect a finding that the
Company bargained in good faith for the management clause. (See the last paragraph of
the opinion.) The evidence relied upon by the court of appeals in making this findingif it was a finding -is not indicated in its opinion, nor does Chief Justice Vinson's
majority opinion indicate why the finding was "accepted," except that it does cite, as
evidence of good faith, the fact that the Company's proposal countered the Union's demand for "unlimited arbitration." The opinion also implies that good faith might be
shown on the basis of support for the proposal by "the traditions of bargaining in the
particular industry."
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to its proposal27 or, as the dissenting justices argued, on the conclusion that the Company sought to avoid, either then or during
the contract term, any bargaining on the matters covered by the
proposed provision. The difference between "insisting on" and
"bargaining for" a given proposal became too subtle for the
lawyers28 and for a majority of the justices.
In its general aspect, the decision appears to be an admonition
27 The trial examiner, while holding that the Company "had a right to insist upon
the inclusion of the 'prerogative' clause in any contract," found that the Company entered the negotiations with a "predetermined" and "inflexible" resolution not to reach
agreement with the Union on terms which would in any way enhance the Union's
position, but, instead, intended to discredit the Union. The Company's "inflexible position" as to the prerogative clause was regarded as part of the relevant evidence. The
Board's short opinion seemed primarily to emphasize this same idea, in referring to
"Respondent's inflexible position" (89 N.L.R.B. 185), in its conclusion that "Respondent's concepts concerning its management prerogatives so pervaded the negotiations
that every effort by the Union to bypass this issue and proceed with other matters was
met with frustration" (id. at p. 186), and in its depiction of the situation as one in
which the Company demanded or insisted on the prerogative clause "as a condition to
agreement' (id. at p. 187). On the other hand, the Board also stated, in reference to
that part of Section 8(d) which provides that neither party is required to make a
concession, "But this does not mean that any party may thereby preclude agreement by
maintaining a position which is inconsistent with the bargaining rights of the other
party" (ibid.). This indicates at least some confusion as to the precise theory of the
Board's decision.
25 The Board's petition for a writ of certiorari, and its brief in the Supreme Court,
exhibited confusion as to the issue involved. In the petition and in brief the question
was stated to be "whether the employer violated section 8(a) (5) of the Act by refusing
to enter into any contract with a union unless the union agreed to include therein a
clause waiving the statutory right to bargain about certain terms or conditions of employment." In the Company's reply to the petition this statement of the issue was
described as "both inaccurate and inept." Instead, said counsel for respondent, "It
seems to us that the questions presented are: ONE, whether or not Clause III of the
existing contract ...is in and of itself unlawful; and TWO, whether or not Respondent
has violated the Labor-Management Relations Act by the manner in which it sought
the inclusion of such clause in such contract .....
' The Board's brief left its basic
approach in doubt. The Board may have believed that the respondent's fault lay in its
adamant attitude and inflexibility in bargaining, or in its very assertion of the proposition that it should determine unilaterally and finally certain matters within the collective
bargaining area. This statement appears in the brief (pp. 18-19) :
"... While an employer may lawfully propose that the union waive a
portion of its bargaining rights, and offer economic concessions that he is free
under the Act to withhold as an inducement to obtain the union's assent, he
may not lawfully even compel discussion, much less compel assent, to such a
proposal, either by refusing to recognize the union's right to bargain about the
issue in dispute, or by conditioning the continuation of negotiations or the execution of a contract upon it."
Meaning what?
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to the Board to moderate its close scrutiny of the play and byplay
of collective bargaining negotiations in the application of the
"good faith" standard. The Court's general attitude seems justified from the pre-enactment history of Section 8(d), which suggests that Congress contemplated a less pervasive use of the test.29
On general policy grounds, also, the Court's reaction seems sound.
Certainly, where bargaining is carried on between parties who
are experienced, and where the record gives no reason to doubt
the employer's acceptance of the institution of bargaining or the
status of the union, it is difficult to understand how any great
social need is served by making available to either party, as an
additional bargaining weapon, the threat of an ex post facto Board
repudiation of the other party's proposals or arguments, or, as in
the instant case, a decision the effect of which is to force one party
formally to withhold a proposal for a management clause rather
than simply to refuse to accept the union's own proposal. Experienced and knowledgeable parties will andshould take care of
themselves at the bargaining table without having the government
looking over their shoulders. Where the parties are inexperienced
with each other, or there is an unsavory record on either side,
there is some justification for attempting to steer the bargaining
process in order to help "educate" the parties or to help preserve
the union's position. Even in this situation, however, the difficulties
21 H. R. Rep. 3020, 80th Congress, 1st Session (1947), set forth a list of specific,
objective standards in its proposed definition of the term "collective bargaining",
which would have precluded any inquiry into the substance of bargaining proposals
or arguments in support thereof (or the lack of them). The Conference Committee
elected to take instead, on the matter here relevant, the substance of the Senate bill
(S. 1126), but said: "...the Senate amendment, while it did not prescribe a purely
objective test of what constituted collective bargaining, as did the House bill, had, to
a very substantial extent, the same effect as the House bill in this regard, since it
rejected, as a factor in determining good faith, the test of making a concession and
thus prevented the Board from determining the merits of the positions of the parties ......
There has always been a serious question whether the Board's concept of its function
in policing collective bargaining was one contemplated by Congress when it enacted
the Wagner Act. See Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in
American Law, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1065 (1941). As pointed out by Cox and Dunlop,
however, "it was perhaps inevitable that the process of administrative and judicial
interpretation should take the NLRB and courts beyond the stage of recognition into
the conference room". Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the
National Labor Relations Board, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 390 (1950).
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and risks of error inherent in attempting to apply the good faith
standard suggest that the Board should withhold judgment unless
the evidence is so clear as to be beyond reasonable doubt.
Collective Bargaining:Scope of Authority of Union in Negotiating Seniority Agreements. Ford Motor Co. v. Hufman, 0 decided
in 1953, dealt in an important way with the scope of a bargaining
agent's authority in negotiating changes in seniority which adversely affect certain classes of employees. The Court held that
it was within the competence of the Union to agree to give veterans
credit for pre-employment military service as well as the credit
required by statute for post-employment military service, even
though this meant a change in the relative seniority status of other
81
employees. Thus, prior military service, like union officership,
was regarded as a factor relevant to the distribution of job security
and promotional privileges among workers. The decision is of
interest both because it leaves open a wide range of discretion
to bargainers about the highly complex subject of seniority, but
also, looking in the other direction, because the Court nevertheless considers the doctrine of the Steele 2 case to be applicable to
Taft-Hartley as well as Railway Labor Act employers and unions
and as going beyond the problem of race discrimination. On both
points the decision was sound.
Union Collective Action: Section 8 (b) (4) (A). Four decisions
were handed down in 1951 on the meaning of the so-called "secondary boycott" provisions of the amended NRLA. Each case
involved "primary" picketing having "secondary" aspects, or
"secondary" picketing having "primary" aspects, and in each instance the union's objective was organizational. In one (Rice
Milling"s ) the union had picketed a rice mill with the object of
obtaining recognition, and in so doing had induced two truck
80 345 U. S. 681.

31 See Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949).
32
33

Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 323 U. S.192 (1944).
NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., Inc., 341 U. S. 665.
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drivers employed by a customer of the mill to refuse to cross the
picket line for an order of goods. In two cases (Denver 4 and
IBEW"5) the union or unions had picketed construction job sites
in protest against the use of non-union subcontractors, as a result
of which union mechanics had refused to work. In the fourth case
8 6) the union had called a strike of carpen(Carpenters & Joiners
ters at a construction project because the contractor had contracted
with a non-union department store for the installation of wall
and floor coverings. Agreeing with the Board, the union conduct
in Rice Milling was held not to be covered by Section 8(b) (4) (A),
but in the other three cases the statutory provision was held to
be applicable. The Court, incidentally, laid the foundation jurisdictionally for a sweeping application of the NLRA to the building construction industry, including even very small operators.
These cases, on the whole, indicate that Section 8(b) (4) (A) is
to be given very broad scope. For one thing, it is now authoritatively determined that picketing is covered when it induces concerted action by employees and where one of its objects is to
interrupt business relations between two employers. In so deciding
the Court brushed aside the apparent hurdle of Section 8(c) on
the basis that the general must yield to the specific, and on the
further ground that if an inducement to boycott must, to be
covered, involve a threat of reprisal or promise of benefit, there
would be little need for 8(b) (4) (A) in view of the prohibition
of "restraint and coercion" contained in 8(b) (1) (A). These arguments are not fully convincing. Certainly, secondary picketing
which, in context, does not amount simply to a "signal" to affiliated unionists to strike could be held to be privileged by 8(c)
without making the secondary boycott provision redundant. To
put an obvious case, 8(b) (4) (A) would still be needed to cover
NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675.
35 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, AFL v. NLRB, 341
U. S. 694.
36 Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL v. NLRB,
341 U. S. 707.
34
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the situation where the primary union, either with or without a
primary or secondary picket line, addresses a specific request
(e.g., by mail or telephone) to another union asking that union
to "help" by instructing its members to cease working for their
employers to the extent that such employers are having business
relations with the primary employer. As regards the question of
whether Congress actually contemplated covering picketing having
secondary effects, the answer is not by any means clear.3 7 It is
probably true that 8(c) was written into the act primarily with
the thought that ordinary forms of publication, particularly when
used by employers, were to be given more protection than in the
past. On the other hand, at the time when the Eightieth Congress

was deliberating, peaceful publicity picketing was still regarded
8 and the two
as a constitutional right. This was before Giboney,"
secondary picketing cases which had been decided in 1942, Wohl
and Ritter,89 would have led one fairly to the conclusion that
8(b) (4) (A) could not stand up, as applied to peaceful secondary
picketing." As of 1951, of course, this was no longer true. The
constitutional barrier having been dropped, the Court, perhaps
realistically, dropped the statutory barrier also.

The broad scope given to 8(b) (4) (A) by these decisions is
evident also from the mode of analysis used by the Court. The
37 For references to important parts of the legislative history see SMITH, CASES AND
(2d ed. 1953) 342-344. The committee reports referred to
"strikes" and "boycotts", and "attempts to induce" such action, but not to picketing," at least by name. Of course, as the Court points out, picketing can easily (and in
some circumstances very properly) be considered to be an "attempt" to induce strike
or other forms of concerted action.
38 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S.490 (1949).
39 Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802, Teamsters Union v. Wohl,
315 U. S. 769 (1942) ; Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v.
Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942).
40 It will be recalled that in the W¢ohl case a New York injunction against secondary
picketing was reversed, while in the Ritter's Cafe case a Texas injunction was sustained.
However, the basis for the latter decision was the lack of "nexus" between the secondary and primary business establishments. The inference is that, as the Court then
viewed the matter, a "secondary boycott" statute drawn so broadly that it encompassed
even secondary picketing of employers having a normal business relationship with the
primary employer would have been invalid. Clearly, 8(b) (4) (A) was so drawn.

MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW
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cases, with the possible exception of Rice Milling, were decided
on the basis of a careful, technical comparison of the elements
of union conduct involved with the necessary ingredients of illegality under the statute. While the Court in the Denver case
alluded to the' very frequent use of the term "secondary boycott"
in the pre-enactment materials, it did not attempt to decide
whether the union's conduct would have been regarded as a secondary boycott, or as illegal, at common law. Rather, the questions
were simply (1) whether the union induced or encouraged concerted action of the kind described in the Act, and (2) if so,
whether one of the objects thereof was to interrupt business
relations between two employers. Thus, the fact that in a very real
sense the construction job site picketing was "primary," not "secondary," was considered to be of no importance in view of the
key fact that two or more employers (the general contractor and
the sub-contractors) were involved and were intended to be
affected. This is the point on which Justices Douglas and Reed
dissented. The cases received precisely the same analysis and
treatment as would picketing by a union of a construction project
which is using lumber emanating from a non-union mill, although
the result is to deny the union any effective opportunity for protest
picketing in the one case while leaving it available, at the premises
of the primary employer, in the other. Congress wrote a broad
provision into the Act, however, without limitations or refinements,
except in one meaningless or at least highly ambiguous proviso,
and the results in these cases are justified by the language used.
They leave in serious doubt the attempts in some quarters to differentiate between "good" and "bad" secondary boycotts,41 and
the Board's attempt to distinguish "primary" from "secondary"
41 See, for example, Judge Rifkind's decision in Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of
Architects, Engineers, Chemists & Technicians, Local 231, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S. D. N. Y.
1948).
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action, as, for example, in its "roving situs" cases."
Left in some considerable uncertainty by these cases is the
status of primary organizational or recognition picketing. Under
Rice Milling, 8(b) (4) (A) will not be applicable simply on the
basis that picketers have, incidentally, sought to persuade (or even
force) a few employees of a customer of the primary employer
not to cross the picket line. But the Court did not immunize this
conduct on the broad basis that it was simply primary picketing.
The rationale was that the picketing was neither intended to, nor
did it, result in concerted action by the employees of the secondary
employer, within the meaning of the Act. That the picketing
occurred geographically at the premises of the primary employer
was regarded as "significant although not necessarily conclusive,"
and it was pointed out that "there were no inducements or encouragements applied elsewhere than on the picket line." Actually,
the decision of the truckers to respect the picket line was as much
"concerted," in the sense of being mutually arrived at, as was
the decision of the carpenters to walk off the job in the IBEW case.
Possibly the factor of controlling significance, in the Court's view,
was the point that the picketing union was not shown to have
contemplated any specific reaction by any other union, or by other
unionized workers. If so, primary picketing may yet be held
covered by 8(b) (4) (A) in highly organized, union-conscious
communities. There is also the distinct possibility that primary
collective action may be reached, regardless of objective sought,
under 8(b) (1) (A) on the theory that it restrains or coerces employees. If Congress does not intend this result, now is the time
to make this clear by suitable amendatory provisions.
Union Collective Action: Section 8(b) (6). The importance of
the pre.LMRA explanatory and expository Congressional remarks
42 See Richfield Oil Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. No.
N.L.R.B. 547 (1950); Sterling Beverages, Inc.,
Sawmill Workers & Santa Ana Lumber Co., 87
erated Services, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949).
N.L.R.B. 2135 (1950).

160 (1951); Moore Drydock Co., 92
90 N.L.R.B. 401 (1950); Lumber &
N.L.R.B. 937 (1949) ; Schultz RefrigSee also Interborough News Co., 90
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of the late Senator Robert A. Taft, as the most influential proponent of the Act, can hardly be more forcefully illustrated than
in the Court's reliance upon them in its two 1953 decisions interpreting Section 8(b) (6), the so-called "anti-featherbedding" provision."' The result was that the International Typographical
Union's insistence upon retention of the practice of setting "bogus"
type in the newspaper publishing industry (i.e., setting type not
needed or to be used), and the American Federation of Musician's
rule forbidding local appearances of traveling bands unless local
orchestras are also employed, are not illegal under the Act despite
their obvious "made work" characteristics. The technical reason
is that under Section 8(b) (6) an essential element of the offense,
said to have been lacking in these cases, is that there be payments
made or solicited for services which are not in fact performed or to
be performed. Clearly, however, the Court could have said, with
dissenters Douglas, Clark and Vinson, that services which are not
wanted, or at least are neither wanted nor in fact used in any
real sense, are not services "performed." But to the majority
Senator Taft had indicated positively that Congress had deliberately selected the gingerly approach to this problem, at least for
the time being, and thus had sought to reach only the "fairly clear
case, easy to determine," by making it unlawful "for a union to
accept money for people who do not work." The printers and the
musicians in question worked; it was as simple as that.
At the time of the enactment of the LMRA, as Mr. Justice
Burton pointed out for the Court, and as Senator Taft stressed, an
experiment was in process with the much broader provisions of
the Lea Act," and certain constitutional problems in relation to
4 American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U. S. 100; NLRB v. Gamble
Enterprises, Inc., 345 U. S. 117.
44 60 STAT. 89, 47 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 506, enacted April 16, 1946. The Act makes it

a criminal offense "by the use or express or implied threat of the use of force, violence,
intimidation, or duress, or by the use or express or implied threat of the use of other
means, to coerce, compel or constrain or attempt to coerce, compel or constrain a
licensee" to take action of the kinds specified, which include: "to employ or agree to
employ, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee,
any person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee
to perform actual services."
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this type of legislation remained to be resolved.45 Congress had no
desire to see its new legislation entangled in these difficulties. Of
still greater significance, however, in the selection of the narrow
language used in 8(b) (6), was probably the point, to quote the
Senator (as did Mr. Justice Burton), that the Senate conferees, in
rejecting the Lea Act provisions which had been incorporated in
the House bill, "felt that it was impracticable to give to a board
or a court the power to say that so many men are all right, and
so many men are too many," and thus to necessitate, in many cases,
"a determination of facts" which "would be almost impossible."
The practical difficulties envisioned in these remarks would not
have been present in the American Newspaper and Gamble cases,
but is clear that they would be serious problems in others, since
employers and workers may and frequently do entertain different views concerning the number of workers needed in connection
with some operation, and just how many are needed can only be
resolved (unless one accepts the notion of complete management
prerogative in this area) by reference to some determination of
work standards, about which reasonable men can and often do
disagree.
Featherbedding, to the extent it is practiced, and meaning by
that term a system of paying for services neither performed nor,
by any reasonable standard, needed, seems to be a patent form
of economic waste. There is, therefore, an obvious plausibility
about any attempt to prohibit the practice. In writing the Lea Act
and Section 8(b) (6) into the federal statute law Congress was
not exactly pioneering, as shown by such common law decisions
as Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber." What we seem to have done,
however, is to prohibit union collective action looking toward
certain kinds of featherbedding, not the actual practice, itself, to
the extent that the employer is a willing participant. If it is the
economic waste which is objectionable, it might seem obvious
45 The statute was upheld in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947).

46 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. 2d 349 (1941).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

.[Vol. 8

that arrangements voluntarily undertaken and executed by employers as well as those resisted should be subject to legal attack,
just as in dealing with the issue of union security we have placed
restraints upon both employers and unions. Perhaps the failure to
open employer pay arrangements voluntarily assumed to legal
scrutiny is in deference to our entirely proper general reluctance
to start along this path of governmental interference. If, however,
we elect not to condemn (legally) the employer's own act, it is
not quite clear why we should condemn the union's attempt to
produce the act, unless we do so only when, and on the sole basis,
as in the Lea Act, that, it is supported by coercive pressure. It
should be borne in mind that we are dealing here, basically, with
the method of allocation of the working force, and our usual
premise is that this is a problem for managers to work out with
their workers, and as between each other, subject to the laws of
competition, and within the framework of social security legislation, employment services, training programs, etc.
Federal-State Relations. The Amalgamated Association case,"
decided in 1951, carried the structure of federal control, based
on the architecture of supersedure, another level higher. In this
decision it was held that Wisconsin could not enforce her statute,
providing for the compulsory settlement of public utility labor
disputes, to utilities subject to the Taft-Hartley Act, because Congress had guaranteed the right to strike, except as limited in the
Act, thus suspending state power to substitute arbitration for strike
action. The argument that the Taft-Hartley emergency procedures
are applicable only in national emergencies, thus leaving local
emergencies without federal attention or solution, and, as it were,
inviting local handling, was rejected by noting that the Wisconsin statute was not limited either to emergency or to "local"
situations. In addition, and of even greater significance, the Court
used this very point as a basis for inferring Congressional intent
47 Amalgam'd Assn. of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of
America, Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383.
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that only as provided in the federal act, were emergencies to be
given any special treatment. This decision, I submit, is seriously
questionable.
It is one thing to infer from Congressional deliberation and
selection an intention to exclude other federal procedures with
respect to essentially federal emergency problems, as in the steel
seizure case; it is quite another thing to conclude that Congress
thereby made its policies exclusive of state action with respect to
essentially local emergency problems. In the entire line of super8 while not
sedure cases, of which Hill v. Florida,"
the first case,
was the most significant of the "early" decisions, there has been
too much of question begging, too little regard for the fact that,
like it or not, we still have a federal system, and too ready an
assumption that complete conformity of policy is essential.
Congress has not spoken explicitly of its intentions with respect
to state action, except in Sections 10(a) and 14 of the amended
NLRA, and only in the latter Section and with respect to the
limited areas of union security and bargaining rights for supervisory employees has it made itself clear. Nevertheless, the guaranties, so-called, of Section 7, including the "right to strike," have
been read as though they were absolutes, and as though they
explicitly warranted protection against state action, when the fact
is that they were fashioned against a background of employer
anti-unionism which, at least primarily, they were designed to
curb. Even with respect to employer action, the Court, itself, in
cases like Fansteel9 and Sands,"0 has shown that these guaranties
are not, and cannot be, absolutes, and the Court's holding in the
Briggs & Stratton5 case shows that the rationale can be found
to support some kinds of state regulation.
48325 U. S. 538 (1945).
49 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306 U. S. 240 (1939).

50 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1939).
51 Int'l Union, UAW-AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 245
(1949).
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It would be reasonable to make the controlling question in these
federal-state cases an inquiry into the kind, degree and implications of the attempted state limitation on the putative "federal"
right, having due regard not only for the full effectuation of the
basic policies of the federal law, but also, despite the expanded
area of federal jurisdiction under the modern concept of the commerce power, for the place of state and local governments in our
structure and the practical limits of centralism. The argument for
one uniform, comprehensive labor relations policy has its greatest
force in terms of the major industries, whose operations have
direct and substantial interstate repercussions, and Section 10(a)
of the amended NLRA provides some basis for inferring Congressional intent to distinguish these from the essentially local industries. With respect even to the major industries, it should be possible for the states to enact supplementary regulations so long as
they do not substantially impair federally assured rights. The
fault of Hill v. Floridawas not in the principle applied, but in the
doctrinaire and absolute quality of the application. As one
descends the scale from the major to the essentially local industries, the rigidity of the Court's syllogistic approach becomes especially unacceptable.
It is time that Congress address itself to this problem, even
though the precise formulation of the statutory language should
prove to be difficult. The person who is cynical of the competence
of state government, or who feels that state politics and policies
are likely at least to be inept, if not corrupted by special interests,
may applaud the Court's federal-state decisions. I share some of
this cynicism; but I also believe that state power should not be
scuttled by indirect attack except perhaps in the most urgent situations. I think also that it is sound politics to encourage the development of responsible government at the grass roots level. The Court
does not contribute to this goal with decisions like Amalgamated.

Miscellaneous Taft-Hartley Cases. In NLRB v. Rockaway News
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Supply Co., Inc.,52 the Court had the opportunity to consider
whether the refusal of a worker, because of his trade union principles, to cross a picket line, is a form of protected activity under
the Taft-Hartley Act. This issue had arisen also in a case decided
in the Seventh Circuit,5" and was evidently thought by counsel
not only to be present but to merit serious and elaborate argument.
However, the Court refused to consider the general question on
the facts presented, since the employer's discharge of the worker
had been upheld by an arbitration board, convened under contract
grievance procedure, on the dual grounds that a worker should
not resort to self-help with respect to a foreman's order and that
the collective agreement, in effect, obligated the worker, under the
no-strike clause, to cross the picket line. The real importance of
the case may lie in the Court's implicit approval of the resolution
of labor relations act (as well as contract) issues by arbitration,
and in the Court's view that a collective agreement need not be
condemned as a whole simply because it contains an illegal
union security provision. 4
ILWU v. Juneau Spruce Corporation,5 decided in 1952, made
of Section 303 of the Act an important remedy, standing on its
own foundation, by holding that an employer injured by union
concerted action in the prosecution of a jurisdictional dispute
could bring an action for damages without waiting for an NLRB
adjudication under Title I. The opportunity which the unions have
under Section 10(k) of Title I to avoid an NLRB unfair labor
practice finding and order by settling their jurisdictional conflict
by arbitration or otherwise is therefore not available insofar as
damage liability is concerned. Moreover, the decision means that
a union runs the risk (as, of course, does the employer) that
52

345 U. S. 71 (1953).

53 NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 189 F. 2d 124 (1951).
54 The Court rejected the argument that, because the collective agreement con-

taining the arbitration and no-strike provisions also contained an invalid union-security
clause, it was invalid in its entirety.
55342 U. S. 237.
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judicial and administrative interpretations of complex but comprehensive statutory language may differ. The case, finally, may
stimulate use of the damage remedy. The judgment was for
$750,000.
Three decisions dealing with various aspects of back pay awards
were issued during the three-year period. In NLRB v. Cullett
Gin Co., Inc., 6 the Court held, without dissent but with the Chief
Justice not participating, that the Board may refuse to deduct state
unemployment compensation payments from such awards. Nathanson v. NLRB57 held that a back pay order may be proved by the
Board against the bankruptcy estate of the employer as an implied
contract under Section 63a( 4 ) of the Bankruptcy Act, but that
the claim, though proved by the Government, is entitled to priority
only insofar as it represents wages, not to exceed $600 to each
employee involved, earned within three months before the filing
of the bankruptcy petition, thus rejecting the contention that
priority might be based on the theory that such claim is a debt
owing to the United States. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of
Miami, Inc.," resulted in approval by the Court of the so-called
"Woolworth formula" pursuant to which the Board, since 1950,
has been computing back pay by calendar quarters and offsetting
against the back pay liability for a given quarterly period earnings from other employment during such period, but not during
other periods. The Gullett Gin and Seven-Up cases show a continuing and commendable disposition on the part of the Court,
despite the tightening up on the process of reviewing the Board's
fact finding, to allow great latitude to the Board in the shaping
of affirmative remedies. One might perhaps dispute the logic or
soundness of the proposition that unemployment compensation
payments are purely "collateral" benefits of an illegal discharge,
and thus rightfully disassociated, like collateral losses, in framing
56 340 U. S.361 (1951).
57 344 U. S. 25 (1952).
5s344 U. S. 344 (1953).
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an order of reimbursements for lost earnings, just as one might
contend that the "Woolworth formula" is not a strict application
of the mitigation principle. The fact remains, however, that the
Board in each instance made a case for its rule, drawing to a
large extent upon its administrative experience; to the majority
of the Court this settled the legal point.
The non-Communist affidavit provisions of the Act of 1947 were
subjected to examination and interpretation in two important
cases. The Highland Park case,59 decided in 1951, held that the
filing "requirement" of Section 9(h) of Title I applies not only
to the officers of the labor organization (in this case an "international," the TWUA) which may be seeking to invoke the statute,
but also to officers of the top federation, if any, with which it is
affiliated (in this instance, the CIO). The Court, over the dissent
of Justices Frankfurter, and Douglas, refused to give the terms
"national or international," as used in Section 9(h), the technical
nominative meanings commonly accorded them in the trade union
vernacular, and treated them as "geographic terms." The dissenters had the better of the argument in terms of strict logic and
semantics, for to treat these terms as simply "geographic" would
be to eliminate any filing requirement for an affiliated union organized regionally, which would be nonsense. But it would equally
be absurd to hold that the affiliated "international's" officers must
file, but not the top officers of the federated union; so the decision
achieved the right result, granting the purpose of the provision,
which was to reduce Communist infiltration of labor organizations. NLRB v. Dant,6 ° decided in 1953, held that the Board may
entertain an unfair labor practice charge by a union whose officers
are not in compliance, and may issue a complaint based upon
such charge provided there is compliance by the time the complaint issues. This decision was the result of a meticulous application of the language of the Act, which literally differentiates, on
59 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U. S. 322 (1951).
60 344 U. S. 375.
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this point, between representation and complaint proceedings. One
can hardly quarrel with the decision, for the important point is
that the benefits of the Act (to-wit, the actual correction of unfair
labor practices, in this case) be denied to a non-complying union.
The benefit accrues from the actual prosecution of an unfair labor
practice charge, not the preliminary investigation of the charge.
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT

The period under review produced two decisions under the
Railway Labor Act. One, BRT v. Howard,6 resulted in an expanded application of the important 1944 doctrine of Steele v.
L & N Ry.62 and must therefore rank as a decision of prime
importance, especially since, as previously observed in referring
to Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,68 the concept of fiduciary obligation attaching to a statutory bargaining representative's status is
one that certainly extends to unions deriving their authority from
the Taft-Hartley Act. The other case, Transcontinental& Western
Air, Inc. v. Koppal,64 is of more limited significance, involving
technical aspects of remedial procedures available with respect
to illegal discharges of railway employees.
The first case was another legal chapter in the history of the
problem of racial discrimination on the railroads. The Frisco
Railroad, under pressure from the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, had entered into an agreement, in 1946, providing that
"train porters" should no longer do any brakeman's work, although for many years the porters, who were negroes, had performed the duties of brakemen, while not being classified as brakemen. The BRT was the statutory bargaining representative of
brakemen, but not of train porters, and refused to admit negroes
to membership. The result of the 1946 agreement was to open
81 343 U. S. 768 (1952).
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additional brakemen's jobs to white brakemen, and to curtail job
opportunities for negroes. The novel question presented by the
case was whether the fact that the train porters had traditionally
been represented separately by their own union, and not by the
BRT, precluded the application of the principle of the Steele case.
On this point the Court split. The majority, through Mr. Justice
Black, held that the dispute did not hinge on the proper craft
classification of the porters, for, as the opinion states, "the contention here with which we agree is that the racial discrimination
practiced is unlawful, whether colored employees are classified
as 'train porters,' 'brakemen,' or something else." As the dis.
senting opinion points out, this view did in fact carry the Court
beyond the proposition, as declared in Steele, that a statutory bargaining agent is under an obligation to represent its constituents
fairly (and thus without practicing racial or other forms of improper discrimination in the negotiation and administration of
agreements). Now the legal proposition must apparently be formulated about like this: A bargaining agent holds its statutory
bargaining rights or privileges as a public trust, and may not, in
the exercise of such rights or privileges, pursue policies, such as
racial discrimination, inimical to the public interest. The three
dissenting justices took the view that the decision in effect wrote
into the law something approaching a fair employment or union
practices code, which thus far Congress, itself, has refused to do.
Perhaps a legal rationale for the decision may be found in the
suggestion, made both in the Steele and the 1. 1. Case Co.6" opinions, that the bargaining powers of a statutory representative are
comparable to those possessed by a legislative body, and are thus
to be exercised subject to fundamental constitutional limitations
which Congress is to be presumed to have intended. This is legal
fiction, of course, but it is not the first time legal fictions have
been used to reach results deemed desirable. In this area the
Court has moved where Congress has feared to tread. Whether
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or not one will be inclined to applaud or criticize will depend upon
his general attitude toward the respective roles of Congress and
Court in the lawmaking process, and perhaps (though unconsciously) his personal evaluation of the importance of the race
issue. In any case, with Steele and Howard leading the way, I
wonder whether the Court will not, before long, close in another
arc in the circle by holding, as did the Kansas court in Betts v.
Easley,66 that a statutory agent may not both exercise its statutory
powers and have discriminatory membership standards?
The Koppal case held that a discharged employee of an air
carrier is not precluded by the Railway Labor Act from electing
to sue for damages, where. the discharge is alleged to have been
in violation of a collective agreement, instead of pursuing the
statutory remedy before the National Railroad Adjustment Board,
but that such suit, being necessarily one under state law, cannot
be maintained without a prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies if this is the state rule. So, if the applicable state law
has the prior resort rule, the effect is to force any employee
covered by a collective agreement to use the contract grievance
procedure and the Adjustment Board if he is to have a remedy,
but if the state does not require prior resort, the employee may
elect as between a damage action and the administrative remedy.
This result followed from the distinctions drawn in the earlier
Moore"7 and Slocum" opinions between cases which do and do
not involve questions of interpretation of the collective agreement.
In the Slocum case the Court had ruled, as it had in the earlier
case of ORC v. Pitney,6 9 that questions of interpretation are the
exclusive prerogative of the Adjustment Board, at least in the
first instance, and also had suggested that a damage remedy on
account of a wrongful discharge, as contrasted with the authority
66
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to order reinstatement, is also beyond the power of the Adjustment
Board to provide, although just why it is difficult to understand.
In Moore it was held that the Railway Labor Act did not require
prior resort to the administrative remedy in the case of wrongful
discharge. The Moore case, in my judgment, set the wrong pattern,
although it certainly may have been right in its appraisal of
Congressional intent. It would be salutary, generally, for courts
to require grievants to use the contract (or contract and statutory)
grievance machinery, at least if there is no denial of due process
to them, nor is there any sound reason for differentiating between
"interpretation" and "damage" issues. At present, however, the
problem is confused not only "on the railroads," but generally.
Insofar as Taft-Hartley employers and unions are concerned, the
federal courts will have an opportunity to make a rule on this
point if, as seems likely, Section 301 must be deemed to create
a federal right to enforce collective agreements.
FEDERAL WAGE-HOUR LEGISLATION

There remains to be considered three cases decided under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and one which involved the WalshHealey Act. Taking the latter first, the Court in Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States"° unanimously held that the two-year
limitation period prescribed with respect, inter alia, to causes
of action for "liquidated damages" under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Walsh-Healey Act or the Bacon-Davis Act, applied
to a suit by the Government to recover liquidated damages for
employment of child labor in violation of the Walsh-Healey Act,
and, significantly, that the cause of action accrued, for this purpose, when the defendant actually employed the minors, not, as
the Government contended, when it was administratively determined that the contractor was liable for liquidated damages. Here
the Court simply refused to entertain the Government's suggestion
that it should, in effect, amend a statute which in this instance
70
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used unambiguous language. In the light of the doctrine of prior
resort, which the Court implies that it would apply without question to Walsh-Healey enforcement proceedings, it is evident that
the decision has the effect of barring any action for liquidated
damages in cases where the administrative finding is not made
within two years after the actual violation. This is a weakness in
the remedial system under the Walsh-Healey Act which Congress
should correct.
. The most important of the group of cases being considered are
1 and Thomas v. Hempt Bros.,"
Alstate ConstructionCo. v. Durkin"
in which the Court held that workers engaged in manufacturing
or quarrying operations, where the product, in substantial part,
was used in the repair of interstate roads, were engaged "in the
production of goods for commerce" within the meaning of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court rejected the contention that,
since the goods were to be used locally in highway repair work,
they were not being produced "for commerce," pointing out that
to accept this contention would be to read the statute as if it provided for coverage, under the production test, only if the goods
are produced "for transportation" in commerce. As dissenting
Justices Douglas and Frankfurter point out, it is difficult to fix the
limit of coverage under the principle, as stated by the majority,
that "he who produces goods for these indispensable and inseparable parts of commerce [referring to interstate highways and
railroads] produces goods for commerce." Yet the alternative
would be to hold that only employees actually engaged in the
actual processes of interstate commerce are covered under the
"in commerce" test, and the Court shows no inclination to reverse
its direction and overrule such cases as Overstreet v. North Shore
Corp.7 8 Congress addressed itself to the problem of deciding who
are producers, for the purposes of the "production of goods for
commerce" test, by defining "produced" in such a way as to reach
71345 U. S. 13 (1953).
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activities closely related or directly essential to actual production.
The Court has really linked the "in commerce" and "production
of goods for commerce" bases of coverage in these two cases,
and in substance, in using an "indispensability" test, is only
doing, with respect to the meaning of "in commerce" what Congress has approved in dealing with "production." Yet the result
will necessarily be to reach manufacturing and processing operations which would not be reached otherwise.
The fourth case of the wage-hour group was United States v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. 4 Here, with only Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, the Court took much of the sting out of the criminal
sanctions provided by the FLSA by holding that the offense made
punishable by the statute is a "course of conduct," not each separate transaction resulting in civil liability to an employee, and,
presumably, not each failure to keep each record required to be
kept. The decision makes it highly important to be able to determine what is a course of conduct, and the answer, as given by the
Court, is that it consists of all violations that arise "from that
singleness of thought, purpose or action, which may be deemed a
single 'impulse'." Thus, a single decision, or impulse, of management that certain kinds of activities are not compensable working
time would evidently constitute but one criminal violation, though
more than one day or week and more than one employee are
affected. The decision of the Court was one not clearly required
under the language of the Act. Indeed, Mr. Justice Douglas
charged the majority with inventive lawmaking. The majority
found some support for their conclusion in the legislative history
of the provisions in question, but one may well suppose that they
were influenced also by the fact that the preventive and civil
remedies provided by the Act are the more important sanctions.
The fact that the damage action can result in double recovery,
and thus itself partakes of a punitive character, makes stiff criminal penalties less necessary than would otherwise be the case.
74 344

U. S. 218 (1953).

